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For diﬀerential games of ﬁxed duration of linear dynamical systems with non-
quadratic payoﬀ functionals, it is proved that the value and the optimal strate-
gies as saddle point exist whenever the associated pseudo-Riccati equation has
a regular solution P(t,x). Then the closed-loop optimal strategies are given by
u(t) = −R−1B∗P(t,x(t)), v(t) = −S−1C∗P(t,x(t)). For diﬀerential game problems
of Mayer type, the existence of a regular solution to the pseudo-Riccati equa-
tion is proved under certain assumptions and a constructive expression of that
solution can be found by solving an algebraic equation with time parameter.
1.Introduction
The theory of diﬀerential games has been developed for several decades. The
early results of diﬀerential games of a ﬁxed duration can be found in [2, 3, 5],
andthereferencestherein.Forlinear-quadraticdiﬀerentialandintegralgamesof
distributed systems, the closed-loop syntheses have been established in various
ways and cases in [6, 8, 10], and most generally in terms of causal synthesis
[12, 14].
Inanotherrelevantarena,thesynthesisresultsfornonquadraticoptimalcon-
trol problems of linear dynamical systems have been obtained in [11, 13], and
some of the references therein. The key issue is how to ﬁnd and implement non-
linear closed-loop optimal controls with nonquadratic criteria, which have been
solved with the aid of a quasi-Riccati equation.
In this paper, we investigate nonquadratic diﬀerential games of a ﬁnite-di-
mensional linear system, with a remark that the generalization of the obtained
results to inﬁnite-dimensional distributed systems has no essential diﬃculty.
Here the primary objective is to explore whether the linear-nonquadratic
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diﬀerential game problem has a value and whether a saddle point of optimal
strategies exists and can be found in terms of an explicit state feedback.
Since the players’ sets of choices are not compact for such a diﬀerential game
of ﬁxed duration and (unlike the quadratic optimal control problems) its payoﬀ
functional has no convexity or concavity in general, the existences of a value,
a saddle point, and most importantly a feedback implementation of optimal
strategies in a constructive manner for this type of games are still open issues.
We will tackle these issues with a new idea of pseudo-Riccati equation.
Let T>0 be ﬁnite and ﬁxed. Consider a linear system of diﬀerential equa-
tions:
dx
dt
= Ax+Bu(t)+Cv(t),x (0) = x0, (1.1)
where the state function x(t) and initial data x0 take values in Rn, u(t)a st h e
control of the player (I) takes value in Rm and governed by a strategy (which is
denoted simply by u), and v(t) as the control of the player (II) takes value in Rk
and governed by a strategy (which is denoted simply by v). The inner products
in Rn, Rm,a n dRk will be denoted by  ·,· , which will be clear in the context.
Deﬁne function spaces X = L2(0,T;Rn), Xc = C([0,T];Rn), U = L2(0,T;Rm),
and V = L2(0,T;Rk). Assume that A, B,a n dC are, respectively, n×n, n×m,a n d
n×k constant matrices. Any pair of strategies {u,v}∈U×V is called admissible
strategies.
Set a nonquadratic payoﬀ functional
J

x0,u,v

= M

x(T)

+
T
0

Q

x(T)

+
1
2

Ru(t),u(t)

+
1
2

Sv(t),v(t)

dt,
(1.2)
where M and Q are functions in C2(Rn), R is an m×m positive deﬁnite matrix,
and S is a k×k negative deﬁnite matrix. The game problem is to ﬁnd a pair of
optimal strategies {ˆ u, ˆ v}∈U×V in the following sense of saddle point:
J

x0, ˆ u,v

≤ J

x0, ˆ u, ˆ v

≤ J

x0,u,ˆ v

, (1.3)
for any admissible strategies u ∈ U and v ∈ V.I f
sup
v
inf
u
J

x0,u,v

= inf
u
sup
v
J

x0,u,v

, (1.4)
then the number given by (1.4) is denoted by J∗(x0) and called the value of this
game. It is seen that whenever a pair of optimal strategies exists, the game has a
value and indeed J∗(x0) = J(x0, ˆ u, ˆ v).Yuncheng You 63
We denote by L(E1,E2) the space of bounded linear operators from Banach
space E1 to Banach space E2 with the operator norm. If E1 = E2, then this oper-
ator space is denoted by L(E1). Any matrix with superscript ∗ means its trans-
posed matrix and any bounded linear operator with superscript ∗ means its ad-
joint operator. Here, we mention the following relation between a Fr´ echet dif-
ferentiable mapping f deﬁned in a convex, open set of a Banach space and its
Fr´ echet derivative Df,
f (x+h)− f(x) =
1
0
Df(x+sh)hds. (1.5)
All the concepts and results in nonlinear analysis used in this paper, such as
gradient operator and proper mapping, can be found in [1, 9].
2.Pseudo-Riccatiequations
Tostudythesolvabilityofthenonquadraticdiﬀerentialgameproblemdescribed
by (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3), we consider the following pseudo-Riccati equation as-
sociated with the game problem:
Pt(t,x)+Px(t,x)Ax+A∗P(t,x)
−Px(t,x)

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
P(t,x)+Q (x)
= 0, for (t,x) ∈ [0,T]×Rn,
(2.1)
with the terminal condition
P(T,x) = M (x), for x ∈ Rn. (2.2)
The unknown of the pseudo-Riccati equation is a nonlinear mapping P(t,x):
[0,T]×Rn → Rn.W eu s ePt and Px to denote the partial derivatives of P with
respect to t and x, respectively. This pseudo-Riccati equation (2.1)w i t hd e t e r -
mining condition (2.2) will be denoted by (PRE).
Deﬁnition 2.1. Am a p p i n gP(t,x):[ 0 ,T]×Rn → Rn is called a regular solution
of the (PRE) if P satisﬁes the following conditions:
(i) P(t,x)isc ontin uousin(t,x)andcontinuouslydiﬀerentiable,respectively,
in t and in x,a n dP satisﬁes (2.1) and condition (2.2);
(ii) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P(t,·):Rn → Rn is a gradient operator;
(iii) the initial value problem
dx
dt
= Ax−

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
P(t,x),x (0) = x0, (2.3)
has a unique global solution x ∈ Xc for any given x0 ∈ Rn.64 Syntheses of diﬀerential games and pseudo-Riccati equations
Suppose P is a regular solution of the (PRE). According to the deﬁnition of
gradient operators (cf. [1]), for any t ∈ [0,T] there exist anti-derivatives Φ(t,x)
of P(t,x), which are nonlinear functionals Φ(t,x):[ 0 ,T]×Rn → R such that
Φx(t,x) = P(t,x), (t,x) ∈ [0,T]×Rn. (2.4)
Since anti-derivatives may be diﬀerent only up to a constant, we can set the fol-
lowing condition to ﬁx the constant:
Φ(t,0) ≡ M(0), 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.5)
Lemma 2.2. Let x(·) be any state trajectory corresponding to an initial state x0 and
any admissible strategies {u,v}.I fP(t,x) is a regular solution of the (PRE) given
by (2.1)a n d( 2.2), and Φ(t,x) is the anti-derivative of P(t,x) with (2.5)b e i n g
satisﬁed, then Φ(·,x(·)) is an absolutely continuous function on [0,T],w h i c hi s
denoted by Φ(·,x(·)) ∈ AC([0,T];R).
Proof. From the expression of any state trajectory,
x(t) = eAtx0+
t
0
eA(t−s)
Bu(s)+Cv(s)
	
ds, t ∈ [0,T], (2.6)
it is seen that x ∈ AC([0,T];R)∩Clip([0,T];R). From (1.5), (2.4), and (2.5)i t
follows that
Φ

t,x(t)

=
1
0

P

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

ds+M(0),t ∈ [0,T]. (2.7)
Let Ω be a closed and convex set deﬁned by
Ω = Cl. conv.


sx(t) | 0 ≤ s ≤ 1,t∈ [0,T]

, (2.8)
where x is a trajectory as above. According to Deﬁnition 2.1, P(t,x), Pt(t,x), and
Px(t,x) are all uniformly bounded in their norms over the convex, compact set
[0,T]×Ω.Bythemeanvaluetheorem,itfollowsthatP(t,x)satisﬁestheuniform
Lipschitz condition with respect to (t,x) ∈ [0,T]×Ω.
These facts imply that Φ(·,x(·)) ∈ AC([0,T];R) by the following straightfor-
ward estimation based on (2.7):
 Φ

t,x(t)

−Φ

τ,x(τ)
 
=
   
1
0

P

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

ds−
1
0

P

τ,sx(τ)

,x(τ)

ds
   
≤
   
1
0

Pt

ξ,sx(t)

(t−τ)+Px(τ,sη)

x(t)−x(τ)

,x(t)

ds
   
+
   
1
0

P

τ,sx(τ)

,x(t)−x(τ)

ds
   
≤ K

|t−τ|+
 x(t)−x(τ)
 
,
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for any t, τ ∈ [0,T], where ξ is between t and τ, η is between x(t)a n dx(τ),
and K is a constant only depending on {x0,u,v,T}. Since we have shown earlier
that x ∈ Clip([0,T];R), this implies that Φ(·,x(·)) ∈ AC([0,T];R). The proof is
completed. 
Now we prove a key lemma which addresses the connection of the (PRE) and
the concerned diﬀerential game problem.
Lemma 2.3. Under the same assumptions as in Lemma 2.2,i th o l d st h a t
d
dt
Φ

t,x(t)

= Q(0)−Q

x(t)

+

Bu(t)+Cv(t),P

t,x(t)

+
1
0

Px

t,sx(t)

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
P

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

ds,
(2.10)
for almost every t ∈ [0,T].
Proof. As a consequence of Lemma 2.2, Φ(t,x(t)) is a.e. diﬀerentiable with re-
spect to t in [0,T]. On the other hand, from the proof of Lemma 2.2 it is seen
thattheintegrandfunction  P(t,sx(t)),x(t) in(2.7)isuniformlyLipschitzcon-
tinuous with respect to t and a Lipschitzian constant can be made independent
of the integral variable s ∈ [0,1].
According to the diﬀerentiation theorem for Lebesgue integrals with param-
eters, we can diﬀerentiate two sides of (2.7)t oo b t a i n
d
dt
Φ

t,x(t)

=
1
0
d
dt

P

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

ds
=
1
0

Pt

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

+

Px

t,sx(t)
dx
dt
,sx(t)

+

P

t,sx(t)

,
dx
dt

ds
=
1
0

Pt

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

+

Px

t,sx(t)

Asx(t),x(t)

+

A∗P

t,sx(t)

,x(t)
	
ds
+
1
0

Px

t,sx(t)

Bu(t)+Cv(t)

,x(t)

sds
+
1
0
P

t,sx(t)

ds,Bu(t)+Cv(t)

=
1
0

Px

t,sx(t)

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
P

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

ds
−
1
0

Q 
sx(t)

,x(t)

ds66 Syntheses of diﬀerential games and pseudo-Riccati equations
+

Bu(t)+Cv(t),
1
0

Px

t,sx(t)

sx(t)+P

t,sx(t)
	
ds

=
1
0

Px

t,sx(t)

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
P

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

ds
−Q

x(t)

+Q(0)+

Bu(t)+Cv(t),
1
0

Px

t,sx(t)

sx(t)+P(t,sx(t)
	
ds

,
(2.11)
where in the penultimate equality we used the pseudo-Riccati equation (2.1)
and the fact that Px(t,x) is a selfadjoint operator (symmetric matrix), Px(t,x) =
Px(t,x)∗, because P(t,x) is a gradient operator with respect to x (cf. [1,T h e o r e m
2.5.2]).
Then using the integration by parts to treat the term at the end of (2.11), we
have

Bu(t)+Cv(t),
1
0
Px

t,sx(t)

sx(t)ds

=

Bu(t)+Cv(t),
s
0
Px

t,σx(t)

x(t)dσ·s
   
s=1
s=0

−

Bu(t)+Cv(t),
1
0
s
0
Px

t,σx(t)

x(t)dσds

=

Bu(t)+Cv(t),
1
0
Px

t,sx(t)

x(t)ds

−

Bu(t)+Cv(t),
1
0
s
0
Px

t,σx(t)

x(t)dσds

(2.12)
and by (1.5) the inner integral in the last term of (2.12)c a nb er e w r i t t e na s
follows:
s
0
Px

t,σx(t)

x(t)dσ =
1
0
Px

t,ηsx(t)

sx(t)dη (let σ = ηs)
= P

t,sx(t)

−P(t,0).
(2.13)
Substituting (2.12)w i t h( 2.13)i n t o( 2.11), we obtain
d
dt
Φ

t,x(t)

= Q(0)−Q

x(t)

+
1
0

Px

t,sx(t)

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
P

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

dsYuncheng You 67
+

Bu(t)+Cv(t),
1
0
Px

t,sx(t)

x(t)ds

−

Bu(t)+Cv(t),
1
0

P

t,sx(t)

−P(t,0)
	
ds

+

Bu(t)+Cv(t),
1
0
P

t,sx(t)

ds

= Q(0)−Q

x(t)

+
1
0

Px

t,sx(t)

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
P

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

ds
+

Bu(t)+Cv(t),P

t,x(t)

−P(t,0)

−

Bu(t)+Cv(t),
1
0

P

t,sx(t)

−P(t,0)
	
ds

+

Bu(t)+Cv(t),
1
0
P

t,sx(t)

ds

= Q(0)−Q

x(t)

+
1
0

Px

t,sx(t)

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
P

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

ds
+

Bu(t)+Cv(t),P

t,x(t)

, for a.e. t ∈ [0,T]. (2.14)
Therefore, (2.10) is satisﬁed for a.e. t ∈ [0,T]. 
3. Closed-loop optimal strategies
Undertheassumptionthatthereisaregularsolutionofthepseudo-Riccatiequa-
tion (2.1), (2.2), we can show the existence, uniqueness, and closed-loop expres-
sions of a pair of optimal strategies as well as the existence of the value of this
diﬀerential game. It is one of the main results of this work.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that there exists a regular solution P(t,x) of the (PRE).
Then, for any given x0 ∈ Rn,t h ed i ﬀerential game described by (1.1), (1.2), and
(1.3) has a value and a unique pair of optimal strategies in the saddle-point sense.
Moreover, the optimal strategies are given by the following closed-loop expressions,
ˆ u(t) = −R−1B∗P

t,x(t)

, ˆ v(t) = −S−1C∗P

t,x(t)

,t ∈ [0,T], (3.1)
where x stands for the corresponding state trajectory of (1.1).
Proof. Let Φ(t,x) be the anti-derivative of P(t,x)s u c ht h a t( 2.5) is satisﬁed. For
any given x0 and any admissible strategies {u,v},f r o mLemma 2.3 we have68 Syntheses of diﬀerential games and pseudo-Riccati equations
d
dt
Φ

t,x(t)

+Q

x(t)

+
1
2

Ru(t),u(t)

+
1
2

Sv(t),v(t)

= Q(0)+
1
2

Ru(t),u(t)

+
1
2

Sv(t),v(t)

+

Bu(t)+Cv(t),P

t,x(t)

+
1
0

Px

t,sx(t)

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
P

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

ds. (3.2)
Let β(t,x) be the function deﬁned by
β(t,x) =
1
2

R−1B∗P(t,x),B∗P(t,x)

+

S−1C∗P(t,x),C∗P(t,x)
	
. (3.3)
Then we have
∂β
∂x
(t,x) = Px(t,x)

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
P(t,x). (3.4)
From (3.2)a n d( 3.4), we can get
d
dt
Φ

t,x(t)

+Q

x(t)

+
1
2

Ru(t),u(t)

+
1
2

Sv(t),v(t)

= Q(0)+
1
2

Ru(t),u(t)

+
1
2

Sv(t),v(t)

+

Bu(t)+Cv(t),P

t,x(t)

+
1
0
∂β
∂x

t,sx(t)

,x(t)

ds
= Q(0)+
1
2

Ru(t),u(t)

+
1
2

Sv(t),v(t)

+

Bu(t)+Cv(t),P

t,x(t)

+β

t,x(t)

−β(t,0)
= Q(0)−β(t,0)+
1
2

R

u(t)+R−1B∗P

t,x(t)
	
,
u(t)+R−1B∗P

t,x(t)

+
1
2

S

v(t)+S−1C∗P

t,x(t)
	
,v(t)+S−1C∗P

t,x(t)

.
(3.5)
Now integrating the expressions at the two ends of equality (3.5)i nt over [0,T],
since Φ(·,x(·)) is an absolutely continuous function, we end up with
Φ

T,x(t)

−Φ

0,x0

+
T
0

Q

x(t)

+
1
2

Ru(t),u(t)

+
1
2

Sv(t),v(t)

dt
= Q(0)T−
T
0
β(t,0)dt
+
1
2
T
0

R

u(t)+R−1B∗P

t,x(t)
	
,u(t)+R−1B∗P

t,x(t)

dt
+
1
2
T
0

S

v(t)+S−1C∗P

t,x(t)
	
,v(t)+S−1C∗P

t,x(t)

dt.
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Note that (2.2)a n d( 2.5)i m p l yΦ(T,x)−Φ(T,0) = M(x)−M(0) and
Φ(T,x) = M(x), ∀x ∈ Rn. (3.7)
Then, with (3.7) substituted, (3.6)c a nb ew r i t t e na s
J

x0,u,v

= M

x(T)

+
T
0

Q

x(t)

+
1
2

Ru(t),u(t)

+
1
2

Sv(t),v(t)

dt
= W

x0,T

+
1
2
T
0

R

u(t)+R−1B∗P

t,x(t)
	
,
u(t)+R−1B∗P

t,x(t)

dt
+
1
2
T
0

S

v(t)+S−1C∗P

t,x(t)
	
,v(t)+S−1C∗P

t,x(t)

dt,
(3.8)
where
W

x0,T

= Φ

0,x0

+Q(0)T−
T
0
β(t,0)dt. (3.9)
Note that (3.8) holds for any admissible strategies {u,v}.
According to Deﬁnition 2.1, the initial value problem (2.3)h a sag l o b a ls o -
lution x(·) ∈ Xc over [0,T]. Hence, the strategies given by the state feedback
expressions in (3.1) are admissible strategies. And (3.8) shows that
J

x0, ˆ u, ˆ v

= W

x0,T

, (3.10)
which depends on x0 and T only. For any other admissible strategies {u,v},( 3.8)
implies
J

x0, ˆ u,v

= W

x0,T

+
1
2
T
0

S

v(t)+S−1C∗P

t,x(t)
	
,
v(t)+S−1C∗P

t,x(t)

dt
≤ W

x0,T

= J

x0, ˆ u, ˆ v

≤ W

x0,T

+
1
2
T
0

R

u(t)+R−1B∗P

t,x(t)
	
,u(t)
+R−1B∗P

t,x(t)

dt
= J

x0,u,ˆ v

,
(3.11)
since R is positive deﬁnite and S is negative deﬁnite. This proves that there exists
au n i q u ep a i ro fo p t i m a ls t r a t e g i e s{ˆ u, ˆ v},g i v e nb y( 3.1), and that the value of
this game exists. In fact, the value is J∗(x0) = J(x0, ˆ u, ˆ v) = W(x0,T). 
Remark 3.2. In the above argument which goes from (3.8)t o( 3.11), it is impor-
tant to clearly distinguish the following two concepts: one is the strategy u and70 Syntheses of diﬀerential games and pseudo-Riccati equations
v used by each player, and the other is the control function u(t)a n dv(t)o ft h e
time variable t ∈ [0,T]. The strategy is a pattern like the feedback shown in (3.1)
or any other admissible feedback. When a strategy is implemented, then u and
v become concrete functions of time variable, which are usually called control
functions for the players.
When a pair of strategies {u,v} is diﬀerent from the pair {ˆ u, ˆ v}, certainly the
state trajectories x(t,x0, ˆ u,v), x(t,x0, ˆ u, ˆ v), and x(t,x0,u,ˆ v)a r ed i ﬀerent functions
in general, but as long as the optimal strategy patterns are shown by (3.1), then
we have
T
0

R

ˆ u(t)+R−1B∗P

t,x(t)
	
, ˆ u(t)+R−1B∗P

t,x(t)

dt = 0,
T
0

S

ˆ v(t)+S−1C∗P

t,x(t)
	
, ˆ v(t)+S−1C∗P

t,x(t)

dt = 0
(3.12)
in the derivation of (3.11).
4. Mayer problem:solutionto the pseudo-Riccati equation
In this section, we assume that Q(x) ≡ 0. Then the payoﬀ functional reduces to
J

x0,u,v

= M

x(T)

+
1
2
T
0

Ru(t),u(t)

+

Sv(t),v(t)
	
dt. (4.1)
This type of diﬀerential games described by (1.1), (4.1), and (1.3)c a nb er e -
ferred to as the Mayer problem, according to its counterpart in optimal control
theory and in calculus of variations. Since a general problem (1.1), (1.2)c a nb e
reduced to a Mayer problem by augmenting the state variable with additional
one dimension, it is without loss of generality to consider Mayer problems only.
Associated with this Mayer problem, we will consider a nonlinear algebraic
equation with one parameter τ,0≤ τ ≤ T,a sf o l l o w s :
y+G(T−τ)M (y) = eA(T−τ)x, ∀x ∈ Rn, (4.2)
where
G(t) =
T
0
eAs
BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
eA∗sds, t ∈ [0,T]. (4.3)
Here, (4.2) has an unknown y ∈ Rn and a parameter τ ∈ [0,T]. Equation (4.2)
can also be written as
y+G(t)M (y) = eAtx, for any x ∈ Rn, (4.4)
with t = T−τ,0≤ t ≤ T.N o t et h a tG(t) is a symmetric matrix for each t ∈ [0,T].
However, unlike the optimal control problems, here G(t) is in general neither
nonnegative, nor nonpositive due to the assumptions on R and S.Yuncheng You 71
Firstconsiderafamilyofdiﬀerentialgamesdeﬁnedoveratimeinterval[τ,T],
where 0 ≤ τ ≤ T is arbitrarily ﬁxed. We use (DGP)τ to denote the diﬀerential
game problem for the linear system
dx
dt
= Ax+Bu(t)+Cv(t),x (τ) = x0, (4.5)
with respect to the payoﬀ functional
Jτ

x0,u,v

= M

x(T)

+
1
2
T
τ

Ru(t),u(t)

+

Sv(t),v(t)
	
dt (4.6)
in the sense of saddle point, that is,
Jτ

x0, ˆ u,v

≤ Jτ

x0, ˆ u, ˆ v

≤ Jτ

x0,u,ˆ v

, (4.7)
where A, B, C, M, R,a n dS satisfy the same assumptions made in Section 1.
We ﬁrst investigate the solution of (4.2) and then ﬁnd out its connection to
a regular solution of the pseudo-Riccati equation (PRE). The entire process will
go through several lemmas as follows.
Assumption 4.1. Assume that for every τ ∈ [0,T], there exists a pair of saddle-
point strategies to (DGP)τ deﬁned by (4.5), (4.6), and (4.7).
Lemma 4.2. Under Assumption 4.1, there exists a solution of (4.2)f o ra n yg i v e n
x ∈ Rn and for every τ ∈ [0,T].
Proof. Suppose that {ˆ u, ˆ v} is a pair of saddle-point strategies with respect to
(DGP)τ. Then one has
Jτ

x0, ˆ u, ˆ v

= min


Jτ

x0,u,ˆ v

| admissible u

, (4.8)
Jτ

x0, ˆ u, ˆ v

= max


Jτ

x0, ˆ u,v

| admissible v

. (4.9)
In other words, ˆ u is the minimizer of Jτ(x0,u,ˆ v) subject to constraint (4.5)w i t h
v = ˆ v,a n dˆ v is the maximizer of Jτ(x0, ˆ u,v) subject to constraint (4.5)w i t hu =
ˆ u. Thus one can apply the Pontryagin maximum principle (cf. [7]). Since the
Hamiltonians in these two cases are, respectively,
H1(x,ϕ,u) =

Ax+Bu+Cˆ v,ϕ

+
1
2

 Ru,u +

Sˆ v,ˆ v
	
,
H2(x,ψ,u) =

Ax+Bˆ u+Cv,ψ

+
1
2

Rˆ u, ˆ u

+ Sv,v 
	
,
(4.10)
the co-statefunctionϕ associatedwith theoptimal control ˆ u in (4.8) satisﬁesthe
following terminal value problem:
dϕ
dt
= −
∂H1
∂x
(x,ϕ,u) = −A∗ϕ, τ ≤ t ≤ T,
ϕ(T) = M 
x(T)

,
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and the co-state function ψ associated with the optimal control ˆ v in (4.9)s a t -
isﬁes the same terminal value problem (4.11), with the same value x(T)t h a t
corresponds to the control functions {ˆ u, ˆ v}. Therefore, one has
ϕ(t) = ψ(t) = eA∗(T−t)M 
x(T)

,τ ≤ t ≤ T. (4.12)
By the maximum principle, the saddle-point strategies can be expressed as the
following functions of the time variable t:
ˆ u(t) = −R−1B∗ϕ(t) = −R−1B∗eA∗(T−t)M 
x(T)

,
ˆ v(t) = −S−1C∗ψ(t) = −S−1C∗eA∗(T−t)M 
x(T)

.
t ∈ [τ,T], (4.13)
Hence the state trajectory x corresponding to the saddle-point strategies
{ˆ u, ˆ v} satisﬁes the following equation, for t ∈ [τ,T],
x(t) = eA(t−τ)x0−
t
τ
eA(t−s)
BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
eA∗(T−s)M 
x(T)

ds
= eA(t−τ)x0−
t−τ
0
eA(t−τ−s)
BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
×eA∗(T−τ−s)dsM 
x(T)

.
(4.14)
Let t = T in (4.14) and change variable in the integral by renaming T−τ−s as s.
Then we obtain
x(T)+G(T−τ)M 
x(T)

= eA(T−τ)x0. (4.15)
Equation (4.15) shows that, since x0 ∈ Rn is arbitrary, for any given x = x0 ∈ Rn
ontheright-handsideof(4.2),thereexistsasolution y to(4.2),whichisgivenby
y = x

T;x0,τ

= (simply denoted by) x(T), (4.16)
where x(T;x0,τ) represents the terminal value of the saddle-point state trajec-
tory with the initial status x(τ) = x0. 
Itis,however,quitediﬃculttoaddresstheissueoftheuniquenessofsolutions
to (4.2). Now we will exploit a homotopy-type result in nonlinear analysis for
thispurpose,basedonareasonableassumptionbelow.Foreachτ ∈ [0,T],deﬁne
am a p p i n gKτ : Rn → Rn by
Kτ(y) = y+G(T−τ)M (y), (4.17)
where G(·)i sgi v e nb y( 4.3). Actually, Kτ(y) is the left-hand side of (4.2). Also let
K(y,τ) = Kτ(y). We make another assumption here.
Assumption4.3. AssumethatM isananalyticfunctiononRn,andK isuniformly
coercive in the sense that  K(y,τ) →∞uniformly in τ, whenever  y →∞ .Yuncheng You 73
Aninstrumentalhomotopyresultforparametrizednonlinearoperatorsisde-
scribed in the following lemma, which was ﬁrst established by R. Caccioppoli in
1932 (cf. [4, Theorem 6.3, page 41] and [9, Theorem 16.3, page 176]). The proof
of Lemma 4.4 is shown in [4] and here it is omitted.
Lemma 4.4 (Caccioppoli). Let X and Y be Banach spaces and let Z be a con-
nected, compact metric space. Suppose that f : X ×Z → Y is a mapping and we
write f (x,λ) = fλ(x) where (x,λ) ∈ X×Z. Assume that the following conditions are
satisﬁed:
(a) for everyx ∈ X,thereisanopenneighborhoodO(x)inX suchthat fλ(O(x))
is open in Y and fλ : O(x) → fλ(O(X)) is isomorphic;
(b) the mapping f is proper;
(c) for some λ = λ0 ∈ Z, the mapping fλ0 is a homeomorphism.
Then fλ is a homeomorphism for every λ ∈ Z.
Note that a continuous mapping is called proper if the inverse image of any
compact set in the range space is compact in the domain space. The following
lemma is a corollary of [1, Theorem 2.7.1].
Lemma 4.5. Let f be a continuous mapping from X to Y,w h e r eX and Y are both
ﬁnite dimensional. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) f is coercive in the sense that  f(x) →∞whenever  x →∞ ;
(ii) f is a closed mapping, and the inverse image set f −1(p) is compact for any
ﬁxed p ∈ Y;
(iii) f is proper.
Using the above two lemmas, we can study the uniqueness of solutions of
(4.2) and the properties of the solution mapping based on the aforementioned
assumptions.
Lemma 4.6. Under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.3,f o re v e r yτ ∈ [0,T], the mapping Kτ
is a C1 diﬀeomorphism on Rn.
Proof. WewillcheckalltheconditionsinLemma 4.4andthenapplythatlemma
to this case by setting X = Y = Rn, Z = [0,T], f = K, fλ = Kτ,a n d( x,λ) = (y,τ).
First, it is easy to see that K is a continuous mapping. By Lemma 4.5,
Assumption 4.3 implies directly that K : X ×[0,T] → Y is coercive and proper.
Hence, condition (b) of Lemma 4.4 is veriﬁed.
Second, Lemma 4.2 together with the linear homeomorphism eA(T−τ) shows
that the range of K is the entire space Rn.F o ra n yg i v e ny0 ∈ Rn,l e tp = Kτ(y0)
be its image. By the continuity of the mapping Kτ, for any open neighborhood
N(p)o fp,t h ep r e i m a g eK−1
τ (N(p)) is an open set. Also note that by Lemma 4.5,
K−1
τ (p)i sac o m p a c ts e tf o ra n yﬁ x e dp. Since the function M(·)i sa n a l yt i c ,Kτ(·)
is an analytic function, so the compactness implies that the preimage set K−1
τ (p)
of this p must have no accumulation points, because otherwise Kτ would be a74 Syntheses of diﬀerential games and pseudo-Riccati equations
constant-valued function which contradicts Lemma 4.2. As a consequence, each
point in K−1
τ (p) must be isolated.
Therefore, there exists a suﬃciently small open neighborhood N0(p)o fp
such that the component of K−1
τ (N0(p)) containing y0 is an open neighborhood
O(y0) that has no intersection with any other components containing any other
preimages (if any) of p. Moreover, as a consequence of this and the continuity,
Kτ : O(y0) → Kτ(O(y0)) is isomorphic. So condition (a) is satisﬁed.
Third, for T ∈ [0,T], we have KT = I, the identity mapping on Rn, which is
certainly a homeomorphism. Thus, condition (c) of Lemma 4.4 is satisﬁed.
Therefore,weapplyLemma 4.4toconcludethatforeveryτ ∈ [0,T],themap-
ping Kτ is a homeomorphism on Rn. Finally, since M is analytic, it is clear that
the mapping Kτ is a C1 mapping. It remains to show that K−1
τ is also a C1 map-
ping.Indeed,dueto(4.16)andtheuniquenessofthesolutionto(4.2)justshown
by the homeomorphism, we can assert that
K−1
τ (p) = x

T;e−A(T−τ)p,τ

, (4.18)
where x(t), τ ≤ t ≤ T, satisﬁes (4.14) or equivalently {x,ϕ} satisﬁes the following
diﬀerential equations and the initial-terminal conditions:
dx
dt
= Ax−

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
ϕ,
dϕ
dt
= −A∗ϕ,
x(τ) = e−A(T−τ)p, ϕ(T) = M 
x(T)

.
(4.19)
By the diﬀerentiability of a solution of ODEs with respect to the initial data,
or directly by the successive approximation approach, we can show that for any
τ ≤ t ≤ T,
∂x

t;e−A(T−τ)p,τ

∂p
exists and is continuous in p. (4.20)
Let t = T, it shows that K−1
τ is a C−1 mapping. Thus, we have proved Kτ is a C1
diﬀeomorphism on Rn. 
Corollary 4.7. Under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.3,f o re v e r yτ ∈ [0,T] and every
y ∈ Rn,t h ed e r i v a t i v e
DKτ(y) = I+G(T−τ)M  (y) (4.21)
is a nonsingular matrix.
The inverse matrix of (4.21) will be denoted by [I + G(T − τ)M  (y)]−1.
Corollary 4.7 is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.6 and the chain rule (cf. [1]
or [9]). Thanks to Lemma 4.6 and the linear homeomorphism e−A(T−τ),t h e r e
exists a unique solution y of (4.2)f o ra n yg i v e nτ ∈ [0,T]a n da n yg i v e nx ∈ Rn.Yuncheng You 75
Thissolution y canbewrittenasamappingH(T−·,·):[ 0 ,T]×Rn → Rn,namely ,
y = H(T−τ,x),τ ∈ [0,T],x∈ Rn. (4.22)
This mapping H will be referred to as the solution mapping of (4.2).
We are going to show the properties of the nonlinear mapping H, which will
be used later in proving the main theorem of this section.
Lemma 4.8. Under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.3, the solution mapping y = H(T−t,x)
is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to (t,x) ∈ [0,T]×Rn. Moreover, we have
Ht(T−t,x) =

I+G(T−τ)M  
H(T−t,x)
	−1eA(T−t)
×

−Ax+

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
eA∗(T−t)M 
H(T−t,x)
	
,
(4.23)
Hx(T−t,x) =

I+G(T−τ)M  
H(T−t,x)
	−1eA(T−t), (4.24)
where Ht and Hx stand for the partial derivatives of H with respect to t and x,
respectively.
Proof. Deﬁne a mapping
E(t,y,x) = y+G(T−τ)M (y)−eA(T−τ)x = Kτ(y)−eA(T−τ)x, (4.25)
where (t,y,x) ∈ [0,T]×Rn×Rn.O b v i o u s l y ,E is C1 mapping and Ey = DKτ(y)
is invertibly due to Corollary 4.7,f o ra n yτ and y.N o t et h a t( 4.2)i se x a c t l y
E(t,y,x) = 0. Then by the implicit function theorem and its corollary (cf. [1]),
the solution mapping H(T−t,x)o f( 4.2) (renaming τ = t)i saC1 mapping with
r e s p e c tt o( t,x). Its partial derivatives are given by
Ht(T−t,x) = −

Ey

t,x,H(T−t,x)
	−1Et

t,x,H(T−t,x)

, (4.26)
Hx(T−t,x) = −

Ey

t,x,H(T−t,x)
	−1Ex

t,x,H(T−t,x)

. (4.27)
Directly calculating Et and Ex from (4.25)a n d( 4.3) and then substituting them
into (4.26)a n d( 4.27), we obtain (4.23)a n d( 4.24). 
Beforepresentingthemainresultofthissection,weneedalemmawhichpro-
vides some properties of the inverses of some speciﬁc types of operators. These
properties will be used to prove the self-adjointness of concerned operators in
the main result.
Lemma 4.9. Let X and Y be Banach spaces and A0 ∈ L(X), B0 ∈ L(Y,X), C0 ∈
L(X,Y),a n dD0 ∈ L(Y). Then the following statements hold:
(a) if A0, D0,a n dD0−C0A−1
0 B0 are boundedly invertible, then A0−B0D−1
0 C0 is
boundedly invertible and its inverse operator is given by

A0−B0D−1
0 C0
−1 = A−1
0 +A−1
0 B0

D0−C0A−1
0 B0
−1C0A−1
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(b) suppose P0 ∈ L(Y,X) and Q0 ∈ L(X,Y).I fIX+P0Q0 is boundedly invertible,
then IY +Q0P0 is also boundedly invertible and the following equality holds:

IX +P0Q0
−1P0 = P0

IY +Q0P0
−1. (4.29)
Proof. The proof is similar to the matrix case, so it is omitted. 
Now we can present and prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.10. Under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.3, there exists a regular solution
P(t,x) of the pseudo-Riccati equation (2.1) with the terminal condition (2.2). This
regular solution is given by
P(t,x) = eA∗(T−t)M 
H(T−t,x)

, (4.30)
where (t,x) ∈ [0,T]×Rn,a n dH(T −t,x) is the solution mapping of (4.2)d e ﬁ n e d
in (4.22).
Proof. It is easy to verify that the terminal condition (2.2) is satisﬁed by this
P(t,x) because
P(T,x) = M 
H(0,x)

= M (x). (4.31)
Step 1. It is clear that P(t,x)d e ﬁ n e db y( 4.30)i sc o n t i n u o u si n( t,x)a n d ,d u et o
Lemma 4.8, P(t,x)i sc o n t i n u o u s l yd i ﬀerentiable in t and in x, respectively. Now
we show that this P satisﬁes the pseudo-Riccati equation (2.1). In fact, by (4.23)
and (4.24) and using the chain rule, we can get
Pt(t,x) = −A∗P(t,x)+eA∗(T−t)M  
H(T−t,x)

Ht(T−t,x), (4.32)
Px(t,x) = eA∗(T−t)M  
H(T−t,x)

Hx(T−t,x). (4.33)
From (4.23), (4.24), (4.32), and (4.33), it follows that
Pt(t,x)+Px(t,x)Ax+A∗P(t,x)−Px(t,x)

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
P(t,x)
= eA∗(T−t)M  
H(T−t,x)

Ht(T−t,x)
+eA∗(T−t)M  
H(T−t,x)

Hx(T−t,x)Ax
−eA∗(T−t)M  
H(T−t,x)

Hx(T−t,x)
·

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
eA∗(T−t)M 
H(T−t,x)

= eA∗(T−t)M  
H(T−t,x)

I+G(T−τ)M  
H(T−t,x)
	−1
·


eA(T−t)
−Ax+

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
eA∗(T−t)M 
H(T−t,x)
	
+eA(T−t)Ax−eA(T−t)
BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
eA∗(T−t)M 
H(T−t,x)

= 0, for (t,x) ∈ [0,T]×Rn.
(4.34)Yuncheng You 77
Equation (4.34) shows that the nonlinear matrix function P(t,x)g i v e nb y( 4.30)
satisﬁes pseudo-Riccati equation (2.1), with Q(x) = 0 for the Mayer problem.
Step 2. We now prove that for every t ∈ [0,T], P(t,·):Rn → Rn is a gradient
operator. By [1, Theorem 2.5.2] it suﬃces to show that for every ﬁxed t ∈ [0,T],
Px(t,x)i ss e l f a d j o i n t .F r o m( 4.33)a n d( 4.24), we ﬁnd
Px(t,x) = eA∗(T−t)M  
H(T−t,x)

·

I+G(T−τ)M  
H(T−t,x)
	−1eA(T−t).
(4.35)
ApplyingLemma 4.9(b)tothiscasewithP0 = G(T−τ)andQ0 = M  (H(T−t,x)),
we know that I +M  (H(T −t,x))G(T −τ) is also boundedly invertible. In order
to show that Px(t,x)i n( 4.35) is selfadjoint, it is enough to show that
M  
H(T−t,x)

I+G(T−τ)M  
H(T−t,x)
	−1 (4.36)
is selfadjoint. Since G(T−τ)∗ = G(T−τ)a n dM  (H(T−t,x))∗ = M  (H(T−t,x)),
we have

M  
H(T−t,x)

I+G(T−τ)M  
H(T−t,x)
	−1∗
=

I+G(T−τ)M  
H(T−t,x)
	−1∗
M  
H(T−t,x)
∗
=

I+M  
H(T−t,x)
∗G(T−τ)∗	−1M  
H(T−t,x)
∗
=

I+M  
H(T−t,x)

G(T−τ)
	−1M  
H(T−t,x)

= M  
H(T−t,x)

I+G(T−τ)M  
H(T−t,x)
	−1,
(4.37)
where the last equality follows from Lemma 4.9(b) and (4.29). Hence, Px(t,x)i s
selfadjoint and, consequently, P(t,·)i sag r a d i e n to p e r a t o rf o re v e r yt ∈ [0,T].
Step 3. Finally we show the existence of a global solution x(·) ∈ Xc to the initial
value problem (2.3)o v e r[ 0 ,T], for any given x0 ∈ Rn. Indeed, by Lemma 4.2,
there exists a trajectory x(·) ∈ Xc corresponding to a saddle-point pair of strate-
gies of (DGP)τ=0 with any given initial state x0.T h e nb y( 4.14), the terminal
value of this trajectory satisﬁes
x(T) = eATx0−
T
0
eA(T−s)
BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
eA∗(T−s)M 
x(T)

ds
= eA(T−t)x(t)−
T
t
eA(T−s)
BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
eA∗(T−s)M 
x(T)

ds,
(4.38)
which is equivalent to
x(T)+G(T−t)M 
x(T)

= eA(T−t)x(t), (4.39)
andthatinturnimpliesx(T)isasolutiont o(4.2)withtheright-handsidebeing
eA(T−t)x(t). By the uniqueness of (4.2) shown in Lemma 4.6,w eh a v e
x(T) = H

T−t,x(t)

, for t ∈ [0,T]. (4.40)78 Syntheses of diﬀerential games and pseudo-Riccati equations
Substituting (4.40) into the constant-of-variation formula and by (4.30), we get
x(t) = eAtx0−
t
0
eA(t−s)
BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
eA∗(T−s)
×M 
H

T−s,x(s)

ds
= eAtx0−
t
0
eA(t−s)
BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
P

s,x(s)

ds,
(4.41)
for t ∈ [0,T]. Equation (4.41) shows that the initial value problem (2.3)w i t h
P(t,x)giv enby(4.30)hasaglobalsolutioninXc foranygivenx0 ∈ Rn.Certainly ,
since the local Lipschitz condition is satisﬁed by the right-side function of (2.3)
with this P(t,x), this global solution is unique.
Therefore, we conclude that P(t,x)g i v e nb y( 4.30)i sar e g u l a rs o l u t i o no ft h e
(PRE). The proof is completed. 
Corollary 4.11. Assume that the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(a) for every τ ∈ [0,T] and every y ∈ Rn, I +G(T −τ)M  (y) is a nonsingular
(i.e., bounded invertible) matrix;
(b) the initial value problem
dx
dt
= Ax−

BR−1B∗+CS−1C∗
eA∗(T−t)M 
H

T−t,x(t)

,
x(0) = x0,
(4.42)
has a unique global solution x ∈ Xc for any given x0 ∈ Rn,w h e r eH(T−τ,x)
deﬁned by (4.22) is the solution mapping of (4.2).
Then there exists a regular solution P(t,x) of the pseudo-Riccati equation (2.1)
with the terminal condition (2.2). This regular solution is given by
P(t,x) = eA∗(T−t)M 
H(T−t,x)

, (4.43)
where (t,x) ∈ [0,T]×Rn.
Proof. By condition (a) and the implicit function theorem, (4.2)h a sau n i q u e
solution for every τ and x so that the solution mapping H(T −τ,x)i n( 4.22)
is well deﬁned. Note that Lemma 4.8 depends on the invertibility of I +G(T −
τ)M  (y)o n l y ,a n dLemma 4.9 is independent. Therefore, Steps 1 and 2 in the
proof of Theorem 4.10 remain valid since they depend only on Lemmas 4.8 and
4.9.S i n c eStep 3 is entirely covered by condition (b) in this corollary, we have
t h es a m ec o n c l u s i o na si nTheorem 4.10. 
In an example of one-dimensional diﬀerential equation we will present in
Section 5, the two conditions in Corollary 4.11 can be veriﬁed. Especially con-
dition (b) can be shown by conducting a priori estimates. If one uses Theorem
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existence theory of saddle points such as some generalized von Neumann theo-
rems (cf. [15, Section 2.13]).
5. Summaryandexample
In this paper, we present a new method to study the synthesis issue of non-
quadratic diﬀerential games of linear dynamical systems. The new idea is by the
pseudo-Riccati equations approach. In this direction, we have proved two re-
sults.
T h eﬁ r s tr e s u l ti sTheorem 3.1. It states that under very general conditions,
as long as there exists a regular solution of the (PRE), then the diﬀerential game
has a unique pair of optimal strategies in the saddle-point sense and the optimal
strategies can be expressed explicitly as real-time state feedbacks given in (3.1).
Regarding this result, we have the following remarks.
(i) Thisresultisasubstantialgeneralizationofthesynthesisofnonquadrat-
ic optimal control via the quasi-Riccati equations (cf. [11, 13]).
(ii) This result can be potentially generalized to nonquadratic diﬀerential
games of inﬁnite-dimensional linear dynamical systems. It can also be general-
ized to the nonautonomous cases.
(iii) Since the Hamilton-Jacobi equations are related to the synthesis of op-
timal control problems and the Issac equations are related to the synthesis of
diﬀerential game problems, the relationship between the pseudo-Riccati equa-
tions and these two equations is to be explored.
ThesecondresultisTheorem 4.10whichisvalidforMayerproblems.Itstates
that under two assumptions, which are reasonable though, there exists a regular
solution of the pseudo-Riccati equation and its solution can be explicitly ex-
pressed as (4.30) in terms of the solution mapping of a parametrized, nonlinear
algebraic equation (4.2). Therefore, the syntheses of the Mayer problems have
been solved. Certainly Corollary 4.11 provides a (short-cut) alternative result
with two diﬀerent assumptions. Here we have two more remarks.
(iv) The proof of Theorem 4.10 involves substantial diﬃculties in compar-
ison with the counterpart result associated with nonquadratic optimal control
problems (cf. [11, 13]). In the optimal control cases since M is assumed to be
convex so that M  (y)i sa l w a y sn o n n e g a t i v ea n dCS−1C∗ = 0s ot h a tG(t)i n( 4.3)
is always nonnegative too, one can easily claim that DKτ(y) = I+G(T−τ)M  (y)
is nonsingular and its inverse has an explicit expression:

I+G(T−τ)M  (y)
	−1
= I−G(T−τ)

M  (y)

I+

M  (y)G(T−τ)

M  (y)
−1
M  (y).
(5.1)
However, the above equality does not hold in the case of diﬀerential games,
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is overcome by using a homotopy lemma due to Caccioppoli, Lemma 4.4,a n d
showing the mapping Kτ is C1 diﬀeomorphism directly.
(v) One can investigate diﬀerent solution concepts of the pseudo-Riccati
equations, such as the existence and uniqueness of viscosity solutions. But we
did not address this issue since we do not need it for the main results.
Finally, we provide an example to illustrate the synthesis of a Mayer prob-
lem of nonquadratic diﬀerential game by using the results of Theorem 3.1 and
Corollary 4.11 in this paper.
Example 5.1. Consider a diﬀerential game problem,
dx
dt
= ax(t)+bu(t)+cv(t),x (0) = x0 ∈ R,
J

x0,u,v

= m
 x(T)
 4+
1
2
T
0

R
 u(t)
 2−S
 v(t)
 2
dt,
(5.2)
in the saddle-point sense. Here T>0 is a ﬁxed number. Suppose that a, b, c,
and m are nonzero constants that R and S are positive constants. We are going to
show that Corollary 4.11 can be applied to this problem, with some restrictions
on these parameters in (5.2). Then we will show that the regular solution of the
corresponding pseudo-Riccati equation and the closed-loop optimal strategies
can be found constructively.
The only condition we impose on the parameters is
m

b2R−1−c2S−1
> 0. (5.3)
In this case, (4.2) takes the form
y+G(T−τ)M (y) = y+g(τ)y3 = ea(T−τ)x, (τ,x) ∈ [0,T]×R, (5.4)
where
g(τ) = 4m
T−τ
0
e2aσ
b2R−1−c2S−1
dσ
=
2m
a

b2R−1−c2S−1
e2a(T−τ)−1

.
(5.5)
Note that under assumption (5.3), since a  = 0, we have g(t) > 0f o ra l lt ∈
[0,T]. This implies that I +G(T −τ)M  (y) = 1+3g(τ)y2 is boundedly invert-
ible, namely,
0 <

I+G(T−τ)M  (y)
	−1 =
1
1+3g(τ)y2 ≤ 1, (5.6)
for all (τ,y) ∈ [0,T]×R. Therefore, condition (a) of Corollary 4.11 is satisﬁed.
WeusethesamenotationH(T−τ,x)todenotethesolutionmappingof(5.4).
Then we have to verify condition (b) of Corollary 4.11.H e r e( 4.42) turns outYuncheng You 81
to be
dx
dt
= ax−

b2R−1−c2S−1
ea(T−t)
4mH(T−t,x)3
. (5.7)
Since the right-side function f(t,x)o f( 5.7)i sC1 mapping in t and in x,a s
shown by Lemma 4.8, the local Lipschitz condition is satisﬁed by this function
f . Hence, for any initial status x(0) = x0 ∈ R,( 5.7) has a unique local solution
x(t), t ∈ [0,t1], for some 0 <t 1 ≤ T.I ts u ﬃces to prove that this solution will not
blow up, so that t1 = T.
Let the maximal interval of the existence of this solution be [0,tω). Multiply-
ing both sides of (5.7)b yx(t), we can get
1
2
d
dt
 x(t)
 2 = a
 x(t)
 2−4m

b2R−1−c2S−1
ea(T−t)H

T−t,x(t)
3x(t), (5.8)
for t ∈ [0,tω). Since y = H(T −t,x(t)) satisﬁes (5.4)w i t hτ = t and x = x(t)o n
the right-hand side, we have
y+g(t)y3 = ea(T−t)x(t). (5.9)
Since g(t) > 0f o ra l lt ∈ [0,T], it follows that
y = H

T−t,x(t)

=
ea(T−t)x(t)
1+g(t)y2 ,t ∈

0,tω

. (5.10)
Substituting (5.10)i n t o( 5.8), we obtain
d
dt
 x(t)
 2 = 2a
 x(t)
 2−8m

b2R−1−c2S−1 e4a(T−t)

1+g(t)y23
 x(t)
 4. (5.11)
Due to (5.3)a n d1+g(t)y2 > 0f o ra l lt, we see that the second term on the
right-hand side of (5.11)i s≤ 0. Hence, we get
d
dt
 x(t)
 2 ≤ 2a
 x(t)
 2, for t ∈

0,tω

. (5.12)
Therefore, this solution x(t) satisﬁes
 x(t)
 2 ≤ e2at x0
 2, for t ∈

0,tω

. (5.13)
Equation(5.13)conﬁrmsthatthereisnoblow-upandthesolutionx existsglob-
ally on [0,T]. Thus, condition (b) of Corollary 4.11 is satisﬁed.
ThenwecanapplyCorollary 4.11andTheorem 3.1tothisproblemandreach
the following conclusion. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T,d e ﬁ n e∆t by
∆t =

−
ea(T−t)x
2g(t)
2
+

1
3g(t)
3
. (5.14)82 Syntheses of diﬀerential games and pseudo-Riccati equations
Proposition 5.2. Under assumption (5.3), the nonquadratic diﬀerential game
(5.2) has a unique pair of optimal strategies in the saddle-point sense. The closed-
loop optimal strategies are given by
ˆ u(t) = −4mbR−1ea(T−t)H

T−t,x(t)
3,
ˆ v(t) = −4mcS−1ea(T−t)H

T−t,x(t)
3,
t ∈ [0,T], (5.15)
where H(T−t,x) is given by
H(T−t,x)=

1
2g(t)
ea(T−t)x+

∆t
1/3
−

−
1
2g(t)
ea(T−t)x+

∆t
1/3
. (5.16)
Proof. By Cardan’s formula, the unique real root of (5.4)w i t hτ = t is provided
by(5.16).ThenCorollary 4.11guaranteesthatthepseudo-Riccatiequation(2.1)
with (2.2) has a regular solution
P(t,x) = 4mea(T−t)H

T−t,x(t)
3,t ∈ [0,T]. (5.17)
Finally, Theorem 3.1 is applied here to reach the conclusion of this proposition.

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